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Rear Admiral Edwin M. Rosenberg, Commander, Amphibious Force U.S. Seventh Fleet, greets General Chung Kwang Ho, Commandant of the Marine Corp, Republic of Korea, aboard the amphibious force flagship USS Estes (LCC 12). Admiral Rosenberg conferred with the Korean CMC during his flagship's recent visit to Chinhae, Korea. — (U.S. Navy Photo by JO3 Dean Gruver).

Within 15 Years

Status of Defense Installations Threatened By Rapid Population Growth, Urbanization

The Defense Department could possibly lose 50 to 100 major military installations in the United States in the next 15 years, said the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics in statements to a special House subcommittee on Installations.

Barry J. Shillito said rapid population growth, increased use of aviation and urbanization have resulted "in a myriad of requests for joint use of military installations and for the release of Defense property so it can be used for local purposes."

He noted a "dramatic rise in encroachment pressures," and said the problems of having the military pres-

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DOD Team Meets In Hawaii to Study 2nd Redeployment

Details of the second redeployment of U.S. troops from the Republic of Vietnam were worked out this week at the Pacific Command Headquarters in Hawaii.

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird sent a team from Washington D. C., Sept. 24, to work out the details with the Vietnamization Task Force established at the Pacific Command. A two-day meeting was held at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, Sept. 25-26.

In his announcement of the meeting, Secretary Laird noted that the first Vietnamization planning conference in June developed prompt and effective guidelines for the deployment of the first 25,000 U.S. troops and said he expected the second planning conference to be equally effective.

Secretary Laird also charged the conferees with the responsibility for keeping the American public fully and promptly informed, consistent with security, of developments relating to the second phase of Project Vietnamization.

Rear Admiral William E. Lemos, USN, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), acted as chairman of

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Secretary Packard Backs MBT 70 Program, Says Tanks Essential to U.S. Combat Power

Tanks will continue to be an essential element of U.S. combat power for Army mechanized forces for the foreseeable future in the judgment of Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard.

He told the Senate Armed Services Committee Sept. 9 that tanks of the Warsaw Pact countries greatly outnumber NATO tanks. But it appears impractical, he said, to meet this threat on a "tank-to-tank" basis.

Instead, the U.S. must achieve vehicles that are qualitatively superior to those of the Warsaw Pact countries and augment them with anti-tank missiles such as TOW or Dragon (TOW is a tube-launched, optically tracked, wire guided anti-tank missile and Dragon is a re-designation of the MAW which was a medium assault weapon.)

The deputy secretary said he believed the MBT 70 program would offer a very good base foundation from which the U.S. could derive this needed capability.

"What we face is the need to get the program down to a more realistic basis and to obtain the key improvements which are offered by the work which has been done. In this way I believe we can obtain an adequate,

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Rules Out Modernizing Old Vessels

Admiral Moorer Sees Urgent Need For Nuclear Carriers

A delay in completing the second of the three Nimitz class nuclear aircraft carriers would hinder the combat capability of the Navy, according to the Chief of Naval Operations.

And without a modern attack carrier force to maintain free use of the seas, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer said, the United States "cannot maintain its position as a first rank world power."

He ruled out modernizing older carriers because of the cost and because "no growth factor" is left in the carriers which have gone from straight deck to angle deck, and hydraulic catapults to steam catapults. And to add nuclear propulsion to present carriers "would cost as much . . . as it would to build a new one," he said.

Presently, the USS Nimitz, the first of the new class, is the only one fully funded. The keel was laid in June 1968. It is scheduled for commissioning in 1972.

The second ship, CVAN-69, was originally planned for authorization in 1969, with a 1974 delivery date. So far, contracts amounting to $132.9 million have been placed for the ship, and the President's Fiscal Year 1970 budget includes a request for $377.1 million to complete construction.

The third ship is planned for full funding in Fiscal Year 1971. The Navy originally requested long lead time funding for its nuclear propulsion plan in FY 1970, but the request was deleted after a review of the budget.

NEED FOR FUNDING

If the funding is not restored in the FY 1970 appropriation, the ship will be delayed for at least a year beyond its 1976 delivery date, according to Admiral Moorer.

The Navy plans all three ships to be of the same design and to be bought in series production from one contractor. To delay scheduled funds would "increase component costs and ship construction delays which are in themselves costly."

The three ships are planned to replace the last of the aging World War II Essex class carriers still serving as attack carriers.

INSPECTS EQUIPMENT — Major General Robert J. Dixon (center), vice commander, Seventh Air Force, examines survival equipment during a recent visit to the 31st Tactical Fighter Wing at Tuy Hoa Air Base Republic of Vietnam. With the general are Colonel C. A. Pattillo, left, former commander of the wing, and Major Donald D. Smith, operations officer with the 306th Tactical Fighter Squadron. (USAF Photo by Sgt. J. R. Peden).

The current authorized attack carrier force level is 15 attack carriers plus an anti-submarine carrier acting in an attack role for the duration of the war in Southeast Asia.

"This number may not be adequate to provide the required tactical air power for future contingencies," the admiral said, "particularly in view of the steady deterioration of our overseas base structure."

Because it takes about five years to build an attack carrier, the admiral feels "we will be unable to compensate for the loss of overseas bases . . . by quickly building up carrier force levels over and above peacetime levels."

He said it is not desirable to reduce the attack carrier level by using dual crews to keep all aircraft carriers overseas. Such action would require overseas bases for maintenance and repairs, and "this would certainly add significantly to our gold outflow prolem."

The cost of the USS Nimitz alone will be about ten times as much as for a World War II aircraft carrier, but the admiral feels the investment in an aircraft carrier remains valid for the 30-year life of the ship.

"The investment in a land base has an assured return only as long as the base is needed in the specific location, and international, political and military conditions do not deny or restrict its use when needed," Admiral Moorer said. "The large investment is lost as soon as the particular job is finished for which the base was created."

But, during the life of an aircraft carrier, the admiral points out, it can provide an air base anywhere in the international waters of the world "without prior international agreements or U.S. commitments for base rights."

Additionally, the admiral thinks attack aircraft carriers could play an "essential role" in a large scale conflict in Europe. If forward bases and fuel and stockpile areas were overrun, attack carriers "could be our best and possibly only means of providing tactical air support in a controlled response to include tactical nuclear weapons."

BALANCE OF POWER

Even in an all out nuclear exchange, the attack carrier could "well provide the balance of power," the admiral said.

In a nuclear war, the greatest threat to carriers would not be from ICBM's, because carriers are "virtually immune to pre-targeting, but from air and naval forces, particularly submarines.

However, because the enemy would have problems locating the carriers and penetrating their defenses, the admiral thinks "the probability is very large that some of these ships would survive to deliver their own nuclear punch."

General Ryan Reviews Air Force's Modernization Program

The Soviet Union's growing nuclear weapons force has "eroded our previous position of overwhelming nuclear advantage," according to Air Force Chief of Staff General John D. Ryan.

He said the consequences of a massive nuclear strike "are so grave that we must give first priority to the task of coping with that threat. That is why we place so much reliance on our force of 1000 Minuteman I and II ICBMs. For the future, we will modernize our ICBM force with the Minuteman III, which is now in development. This weapon will provide the advantage of an increased payload and improved reentry vehicles."

While the main purpose of the ICBM force will remain that of deterring a large-scale nuclear strike, General Ryan explained, "we must also adapt our strategic weapons for retaliation against possible attacks of a more limited nature.

"The Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft is a good example of a weapon that is especially suited for this task. This aircraft has been approved by the Secretary of Defense for full scale engineering development in Fiscal Year 1970 and has been designated as the B-1."

The general believes the B-1 will provide the nation with a wide choice of action in a conflict at any level.

"At the strategic level, the bomber is helping to guard against operational gaps that an aggressor might be tempted to exploit. It also provides assurance that an opponent's possible breakthrough in defense against one element of our deterrent would still permit us to launch a sizable counterblow.

"At the conventional level, we have seen a further demonstration of the manned bomber's versatility and effectiveness in massive strikes by B-52s against enemy troops and facilities in Southeast Asia."

For the mission of strategic defense, Gen. Ryan said the most urgent requirement is for systems that will provide balanced protection against ballistic missiles.

"One approach to this problem, the SAFEGUARD ABM, has been very much in the limelight of public discussion in recent weeks. I will now merely emphasize that the Air Force considers it to be an essential step in providing the protection for our force of Minuteman ICBMs.

VISITS MAC—General Jack L. Catton, left, Commander of the Military Airlift Command, talks informally with General John L. Throckmorton, newly - appointed Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strike Command, during a meeting at MAC Headquarters, Scott AFB, Ill. MAC is the command responsible for aerial delivery of troops and equipment and resupply of forces which could be called into action by the Strike Command.

"In our view, an even more promising approach for the future will be to develop a system that can detect, intercept and destroy a ballistic missile in either the boost or mid-course phase.

The Air Force also is seeking to modernize its air defense with Over-The-Horizon radar, an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and a new advanced interceptor.

"The Airborne Warning and Control System . . . will solve three problems in air defense. It will insure the survival of our ability to command and control defensive forces. It will thus enable us to destroy enemy bombers before they could launch air-to-surface missiles. And, it will give us radar coverage of bombers operating at low altitudes over this country."

To prepare for conflicts of a more limited nature, Gen. Ryan said "we will have to attain a high proficiency in a wide range of specialized tasks.

"One of these tasks will be to operate over checkerboard battlefields where friendly, neutral and enemy personnel may be closely intermingled.

"In developing weapons that we can use effectively in these varied roles, we will have to exploit technology on the same scale as that demanded in preparation for conflict at a higher level. That is why we are placing such great emphasis on the development of the F-15 as an air superiority fighter, and the A-X for close air support."

The F-15 would match "our margin of superiority in the skill and experience of our pilots," while the A-X, "as a high-payload, short takeoff fighter, would be well adapted to the demanding task of close air support . . ."

In Vietnam, the general believes, use of improved sensors, illuminating devices, navigation aids and reconnaissance techniques "has paid large dividends" by enabling us to deny the enemy much of the protection once afforded by rugged terrain, darkness and bad weather.

"With these improvements we have become more effective both in locating and hitting the enemy. And we have also been able to measure more accurately the effect of air operations on the outcome of a specific military action or campaign.

"In this way, we can make the results of airpower's employment in limited conflict more predictable as well as more efficient. We can thus expect our proposals on the future use of airpower in limited conflict to be viewed with a correspondingly higher degree of confidence."

Gen. Ryan noted, the Air Force also is taking into consideration the call for greater emphasis on airlift. "The security implications of expanded airlift are becoming more apparent every day."

East-West Relations

Changes in U.S. Foreign Policy—II

In a major foreign policy speech on Sept. 5, Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson discussed the overall strategies and objectives of American foreign policy in "a distinct new era," pointing out some fundamental changes in course, emphasis and direction. Part I of excerpts from his speech, on U.S. Policy in Asia, appeared in COMMANDERS DIGEST on Sept. 20. Below is Part II.

Discussing East-West relations, President Nixon and President Ceausescu of Rumania, right, confer with the aid of an interpreter in Bucharest.

The new developments and changed circumstances to which the President addressed himself in Asia have their counterparts, of course, throughout the world.

Among these, the most important, perhaps, is the tendency on the part of developed and underdeveloped countries alike to focus increasing attention on internal problems. The goals of economic growth, technological development, expansion of educational opportunity, and easing of urban pressures absorb their minds and energies. Their student populations reflect and reinforce those preoccupations.

Among the by-products are waning ideological fervor

> 'To improve our relations with countries not aligned with us, including those that are hostile . . . was the purpose of the President's visit to Rumania.'

and, in the developed countries, at least, growing impatience with the diversion of limited resources into "non-productive" military uses. This inward focus, nevertheless, cannot shut out the outside world, which is reflected back by every significant economic and technological undertaking. Indeed, it may well turn out that the most important by-product of national introspection is awareness of global interdependence.

Neither the U.S. nor the USSR have been immune from these developments. In our country, their impact is made felt in the pressing demands of neglected domestic problems, which have become powerful competitors with the claims of external security.

In the USSR, efforts to cope with agricultural problems and to meet growing consumer demands, on the other hand, are undoubtedly having some effect on Soviet society. "Most Soviet young people," the *New York Times* reported Sept. 2, 1969, "seem almost bourgeois in their desire for more and better material things. They work by day and study by night, saving for vacations, clothes and better apartments."

It would be dangerous, however, to gamble on the proposition that the material aspirations of these young people have fundamentally altered the nature or objectives of the Soviet state. Its actions in Czechoslovakia and its repression of its own intelligentsia bear melancholy witness to the contrary.

But the Soviets also have good reason to seek some relief from the enormous and ever-increasing costs of modern strategic weapons systems. With their massive nuclear stockpile, they may now share our own realization that overkill multiplied by overkill still equals overkill.

An "Era of Negotiations"

This, at any rate, is important among the factors which have led President Nixon to open the door to an "era of negotiations." In heading into this era, we are prepared to "take risks for peace—but calculated risks not

foolish risks.' We shall not bargain away our security for vague improvements in the "international atmosphere."

Progress in East-West relations can only come out of hard bargaining on real issues. A detente that exists only in "atmosphere" without being related to substantive improvements in the relationship between the powers is worse than no improvement at all. It tempts us to lower our readiness, while providing no really concrete basis for reduction in tensions.

If tensions are to be *genuinely* lowered, progress will have to be made in the solution of outstanding issues of a concrete nature—issues such as:

- access to Berlin, and European security;
- a Middle East settlement;
- a permanent resolution of the Vietnam conflict;
- or in the strategic arms limitation talks.

This is the reason also that we and our NATO allies have insisted that a European Security Conference (proposed by the USSR) might be useful only after specific items to be negotiated have been nailed down. The final communique of the NATO Foreign Ministers issued at their May meeting made this point very explicitly. It said:

"The allies propose, while remaining in close consultation, to explore with the Soviet Union and the other

'The Soviets . . . may now share our own realization that overkill multiplied by overkill still equals overkill.'

countries of Eastern Europe which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution."

The manner in which the Soviet Union reacts to our specific proposals on specific issues will afford a test of its basic intentions. If their responses seem reasonable and the manner in which their negotiations are conducted appears to be in good faith, then grounds will have been established to move forward.

But no single step ahead can in itself bring an end to East-West tensions. Identifying, negotiating and resolving disputed situations must be a continuing process, one that will take time, patience and ingenuity. Genuine progress will be achieved only if both sides are satisfied at each step along the way that their security has not been jeopardized.

Whatever, at any rate, may be the progress of our negotiations with the Soviet Union, we shall, in the meanwhile, continue to pursue two parallel objectives. One—closely related to the fulfillment of our treaty obligations—is to strengthen our relations with our friends. This was one of the objectives of the President's trips to Europe and Asia. His European trip, for example, assured our NATO allies that we view the alliance as an evolving partnership, which is capable of growing to meet changed needs.

The other objective is to improve our relations with countries not aligned with us, including those that are hostile. This, of course, was the purpose of the President's visit to Rumania, and the magnificent reception given him there was a graphic indication of the warmth many Eastern Europeans feel toward America.

The Sino-Soviet Conflict

In the case of Communist China, long-run improvement in our relations is in our own national interest. We do not seek to exploit for our own advantage the hostility between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Ideological differences between the two Communist giants are not our affair. We could not fail to be deeply concerned, however, with an escalation of this quarrel into a massive breach of international peace and security.

President Nixon has concluded that our national security would in the long run be prejudiced by associating ourselves with either side against the other. Each is highly sensitive about American efforts to improve relations with the other. We intend, nevertheless, to pursue a long term course of progressively developing better relations with both.

We are not, in other words, going to let Communist Chinese invective deter us from seeking agreements with the Soviet Union where those are in our interest. Conversely, we are not going to let Soviet apprehensions prevent us from attempting to bring China out of its angry, alienated shell.

New Strategy for the '70s

The firmness toward our commitments, realism toward change, and respect for other nations can be seen in varying combinations in all of this Administration's approaches to the problems of foreign policy. Although the United States no longer has the overwhelmingly onesided margin of strength that was ours in the shattered postwar world, we are still a great power, and we have a vital stake in international peace and stability. We cannot shrink from the responsibilities that this fact and the nature of our worldwide interests bring to us.

At the same time, as President Nixon told the Governors on Sept. 8, 1969, "The new strategy for the '70s . . . means maintaining defense forces strong enough to keep the peace—while not allowing wasteful expenditures to drain away resources we need for progress. It means limiting our commitments abroad to those we can prudently and realistically keep. It means helping other free nations maintain their own security but not rushing in to do for them what they can and should do for themselves."

These, in broad profile, are the directions the foreign policy of this Administration is now taking. The unfolding international situation presents us with difficult choices and makes exacting demands. But it also holds before us brilliant new opportunities.

Status of Defense Installations Threatened By Rapid Population Growth, Urbanization

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ence compatible with civilian demands "will become increasingly complicated."

One of the most immediate conflicts stems from the growth of commercial and general aviation, Mr. Shillito said.

He pointed out that in California alone Defense Department requirements have restricted the use of about 41 percent of all the air space. "It is obvious that many of our military operations will require adjustment in order to make room for the next generation of jumbo air carriers and private flying."

In many cases DoD permits joint use of military airfields, but "joint use often results in later demands for complete abandonment of the military airfield . . .," he said.

The ever increasing demand for land for residential or industrial development also puts pressure on an installation, according to Mr. Shillito.

He said some military installations that were constructed in rural areas are now completely surrounded by civilian activities "which are in many cases incompatible with required military operations.

"When this happens, the existence of the military installation frequently becomes of secondary importance to the community."

When the land isn't wanted for development purposes, "we find ourselves under pressure for its conversion for park and recreational purposes."

Again, he said, a request is usually for joint use of the area for recreation, with pressure developing later for complete abandonment of the base.

The Defense Department has more than 9,000 separate installations in the United States, ranging from small recruiting stations in leased space to large military complexes involving hundreds of thousands of acres. Five-hundred fifty of them are listed by the Defense Department as major installations.

According to Mr. Shillito, the total Defense investment in bases in the United States is $32.5 billion. He said the estimated replacement cost at today's values, not including the cost of the land, would be about $130.5 billion.

"From an investment point alone," he said, "we must take the necessary steps now to protect that portion of this investment which we will need during the next 10 to 15 years or longer."

The necessary steps, according to Mr. Shillito, will "undoubtedly" require additional legislation and authority.

He mentioned "sell and replace" legislation and "land exchange" as two methods of acquiring new facilities to replace those being "encroached upon."

'Sell and replace' legislation would encompass authority for the Department of Defense to take all proceeds from the sale of surplus military facilities and apply them against the cost of relocating and rebuilding required facilities.

Land exchange authorization would require the recipient of surplus Defense land and facilities to provide land and new facilities.

Mr. Shillito believes that land exchange authority for the military establishment "would permit us greater flexibility in managing our total assets in the most economical and efficient manner."

He said the Defense Department will be forwarding detailed recommendations to the Congress covering the areas DoD expects additional authority will be required.

Meanwhile, Mr. Shillito, noted, DoD has started a number or reviews throughout the country to learn more about the impact of "encroachment pressures" upon military installations.

Another study will develop a Defense installation master plan for the National Region for the next 10 years. "This project will determine what our image should be, and what activities can and should be relocated . . ."

The study will specifically address itself to the future of the Bolling-Anacostia area, Mr. Shillito said, and the need for additional Defense office buildings and the final removal of all temporary and functional obsolete facilities in the area.

He expects the first model of the master plan to be completed by March 1970, and the final model scheduled for completion by September 1970.

ALL ABOARD — Miss Courtney Ann Tuttle, Memphis Cotton Carnival Princess in 1967, and daughter of Rear Admiral and Mrs. Magruder H. Tuttle of Pensacola, Fla., is headed for assignment at the Balboa Naval Hospital, San Diego, Calif. Her father, now retired, was Chief of Naval Air Technical Training from 1965-67. (Navy Photo by J01 Ron Garfland).

DOD Team in Hawaii To Study Redeployment

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the team sent from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Others in the group included: Daniel Z. Henkin, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs); Glenn V. Gibson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), and Vincent F. Caputo, Director for Transportation (Installations and Logistics).

Dr. Foster Explains U.S. Position on MIRV Test Moratorium

The Department of Defense has no "intrinsic" objection to a joint MIRV test moratorium, provided that appropriate collateral provisions are also implemented, Dr. John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, said in a report to Senator Edward Brooke, R-Mass.

Earlier, Sen. Brooke had written to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird concerning the MIRV. He said:

"The critical importance of seeking a joint moratorium is now recognized by a wide spectrum of technical and strategic authorities . . .

"All of them are agreed that the priority task before us is to forestall MIRV deployment and that a mutual test suspension would be a most valuable step in that direction . . . They emphatically do not agree that it is too late to try such a moratorium or that it is impossible to devise adequate arrangements to monitor such a test limitation."

Replying for the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Foster said:

". . . there is no intrinsic objection on the part of the Department of Defense to a joint MIRV test moratorium, provided that appropriate collateral provisions are also implemented. In fact, a joint moratorium is one of the options we are considering as a candidate for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agenda . . .

"Since we are reacting essentially to Soviet ABM activity, any moratorium must also include suitable provisions for restriction of Soviet ABM capability. We do not consider the Soviet MIRV and our MIRV as symmetrical weapons. Even if they did not have the SS-9, we would need our MIRV as a counter to their ABM."

TESTIMONY ON MORATORIUM

Prior to his remarks to Sen. Brooke, Dr. Foster testified as to advisability of a moratorium on MIRV testing before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

At the beginning, he reviewed the United States' reasons for deciding to deploy two strategic nuclear weapons systems — Minuteman III and Poseidon — which use the MIRV technology.

He said, it is a "well-known fact" that the central objective of our strategic forces is to prevent nuclear war by maintaining a clear and certain capability to deliver unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union in case the Soviet Union attacks.

And, for adequate assurance that our forces will be able to deter an attack, he said, our weapons must be able to survive an attack on their bases and must be able to reliably penetrate any defenses arrayed against them.

The second requirement — the penetration of ballistic missile defenses at Soviet cities — has determined our deployment of these MIRVed systems, he said.

Dr. Foster then explained the types of "so-called penetration aids" which the United States has developed for its missile forces.

AIR FORCE SAFETY PLAQUE—The U.S. Air Force Flight Safety Plaque, earned by the 21st Tactical Air Support Squadron in the Republic of Vietnam, is admired by Lieutenant Colonel Billy J. Long, left, and General George S. Brown, commander, Seventh Air Force, who visited Nha Trang AB, to make the presentation. The 21st TASS won the award for meritorious flight safety in 1968. The squadron, a unit of the 504th Tactical Air Support Group with headquarters at Bien Hoa AB, also won the annual Colombian Trophy.—(U.S. Air Force Photo by Sgt. Harry P. Mall).

The first is the type which involves deception and which attempts to hide our warheads from the defense or confuse the defense by deploying many decoys which appear to be warheads. The second type of penetration aid is more straight-forward and employs no deception. It is the use of multiple "re-entry vehicles," that is, multiple warheads, each of which contains a nuclear explosive and hence must be engaged by the defense.

The first type of penetration technique, deception, is sensitive to the details of the Soviet defense — details which we cannot be sure we know. Therefore, deception gives limited confidence as a penetration measure.

The second type, multiple re-entry vehicles, or MRV's, can give us high confidence that they can penetrate — provided that each re-entry vehicle must be engaged separately by the defense. This penetration technique works reliably because it depletes the defense's stockpile of interceptors if the number of MRVed warheads exceeds the number of defensive interceptors.

The research and engineering director continued:

"The United States has developed both types of penetration aids, the first type because we do not wish any possible enemy to be able to develop and deploy inexpensive and simple defenses and expect them to be effective; the second because we believe that we also must use high confidence measures, ones which do not depend upon detailed intelligence information about our opponent's defensive systems."

Services Announce Plans to Save $356 Million

The Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps have announced actions to reduce Fiscal Year 1970 expenditures by $356 million as part of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's plan to cut defense expenditures up to $3 billion.

Secretary of the Navy John Chafee said the Navy will save $48 million by retiring 22 ships and 11 aviation units, to include Carrier ASW Air Group 57 and 10 fleet squadrons.

The Navy's cut in ships is in addition to 76 ships named earlier, and includes 12 combatant and 10 support ships.

Secretary of the Air Force Robert Seamans, Jr., said Air Force FY 1970 expenditures will be reduced about $193 million by these actions:

—Reduction of personnel strength by about 45,000 airmen, 5,000 officers and 13,000 civilians.

—Reduction in the active inventory of indirect support and test aircraft by about 185 aircraft.

—Phase-out of 24 WB-47 aircraft.

—Termination of the F-100 Fighter Weapons Course at Nellis AFB, Nev.

About 90 of the total are Air Force Systems Command testbed aircraft. These include C-97s, C-135s, F-100s, F-101s, F-106s and F-4s. The indirect support aircraft affected are mainly C-47s, C-54s and T-33s.

Marine Corps actions will include:

—Deactivation of the 5th Marine Division, with the exception of the 26th Regiment which is in Vietnam.

—An end-strength reduction of 20,300 Marines during FY 1970.

—A reduction of about $115 million in Marine Corps expenditures.

—Plans to base on Okinawa and at Camp Pendleton, Calif., elements of the 3rd Marine Division being redeployed from Vietnam.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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AWARDS FOR RUCKER—Lieutenant General Albert O. Connor, left, commanding general of the Third U.S. Army, presents Major General Delk M. Oden, commanding general of Ft. Rucker, Ala., and commandant of the Army Aviation School, a U.S. Continental Army Command plaque in recognition of the post's outstanding Army Community Service program. Ft. Rucker also recevied another plaque for its management improvement program which saved the government $3½ million.

Secretary Packard Backs MBT 70 Program

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realistic design for the MBT 70 which can be produced at a cost which will justify the program."

After reviewing the program the deputy secretary of defense said it was apparent to him that the joint design team tried to include all of the desireable features which should be built into a new generation tank. Mr. Packard believes this emphasis was proper.

"But clearly," he said, "insufficient attention had been given to the problems involved: specifically, a number of possible trade-offs and cost effectiveness factors had not been adequately considered."

The desired objectives for the tank, he continued, were to provide an ability to fight at night; to move, to be more agile and mobile under battlefield conditions; to have a low silhouette and heavy armour; and to kill targets at greater range than has heretofore been possible.

Mr. Packard said he believed all of these capabilities appeared to be possible from the design and test work being done. "And, in fact," he said, "I believe these important features can be provided with simplification of the design."

"It was towards this end," he said, "that I suggested the entire program be carefully reviewed with particular emphasis on the question of what simplifications should be made in the design itself, how the program management could be improved, and what other possibilities there might be to bring the program into a more satisfactory position from which we might move ahead."

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